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occurred when the situationally constrained behavior of the opponent
reflected a disposition that implied a high threat level (competitiveness
or high ability) but sufficient correction occurred when the behavior
reflected a low threat-level disposition (cooperativeness or low ability).
Finally, we discussed the relationship between risk-avoidance and situ-
ational correction in competition.
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In competition, people may benefit from knowing their opponent well be-
cause they can appraise their opponent's strengths, weaknesses, and strategies
(Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). How and how well do people know their opponent?
In this study we investigated people's tendencies to judge their opponent's
disposition in a situation in which they were expecting an interpersonal com-
petition.
To gain understanding about others, people often observe the other person's
behavior and infer his or her disposition from their behavior. Although be-
haviors are often determined or partially determined by situational factors,
many studies have showed that people have a tendency to draw dispositional
inferences even when another's behavior is situationally determined or con-
strained (e.g., Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Jones & Harris, 1967). This tendency to-
ward insufficient situational discounting has been variously described as
"fundamental attribution error" (Ross, 1977), "correspondence bias" (Gilbert
& Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979,1990), or "dispositional bias" (Trope, 1998; Bier-
brauer, 1979). Throughout this article, we will use the term dispositional bias.
Will people make a situational correction if they infer their opponent's disposi-
tion when expecting an interpersonal competition? Our research investigates
whether and how people adjust their dispositional judgment when making an
inference from their opponent's situationally constrained behavior.
In Gilbert, PeUiam, and KruU's (1988) dual-process model, three stages—^be-
havioral categorization, dispositional characterization, and situational correc-
tion—follow each other sequentially to complete the process of dispositional
inference. The first two of these stages are relatively automatic processes that
need little effort or conscious attention, but situational correction is a deliber-
ate and relatively controlled process that requires the perceiver's effort and
cognitive resources (Gawronski, 2003; also see Bargh, 1994). Dispositional bias
occurs when the perceiver is xmable (e.g., does not have enough cognitive re-
sources) or unwilling to make a situational correction about the dispositional
inferences that he/she draws relatively automatically.
Some studies suggest that interdependence can lead people to allocate more
cognitive resources and make m.ore effort to understand a person on whom
their outcomes depend and to improve the accuracy of their judgment, at least
under some conditions (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987).
It was found that people in interdependent (task dependent) situations pay
increased attention to each other's attributes and to expectancy-inconsistent
information (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske,
1990; Stevens & Fiske, 2000). When interdependence is symmetrical, people
individuate others on whom their outcomes depend in both cooperative and
competitive situations (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). When
the dependence is asynunetrical, people whose outcomes depend more on
others (e.g., powerless) individuate the others (e.g., power-holder) and do not
discount information which is inconsistent with expectancy (Stevens & Fiske,
2000). Because of its role in undercutting expectancy-based impressions and
reducing Stereotypie thoughts and evaluations, interdependence may some-
what improve the accuracy of judgments.
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However, studies which did not involve expectancy have suggested that in-
sufficient situational correction may still occur in the inferences of interdepen-
dent individuals.
People in interdependent situations, such as dating or the prisoner's dilem-
ma (PD) game, have been found to make more extreme dispositional inferences
(Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Miller, Norman, & Wright,
1978) because they want to make future outcomes predictable and control-
lable by knowing the dispositions of the others (Heider, 1944,1958) on whom
their outcomes depend. Recent studies have also found that, although basic
negotiation behavior is highly determined by bargaining positions, negotia-
tors primarily interpret their counterpart's behavior in terms of the counter-
part's personality, such as his or her level of cooperativeness or agreeableness
(Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999). These findings imply that people in interdepen-
dent situations may not make sufficient situational corrections when making
dispositional inferences based on their opponent's situationally constrained
behavior because interdependence increases their desire to know their oppo-
nent's disposition. However, the above studies did not directly manipulate
situational constraints.
COMPETITION AND SITUATIONAL CORRECTION
Interpersonal competition can be considered to be a t3rpe of interdependence
(e.g., Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Vonk, 1998). However, interpersonal competition
distinguishes itself from other types of interdependence in several ways. In in-
terpersonal competition the interdependent outcomes of competitors are nega-
tively correlated, such that the success of one individual necessitates the failure
of the other (Deutsch, 1960,1973; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). When a situation is
structured competitively, individuals seek an outcome that is personally ben-
eficial but detrimental to all others in the situation (Deutsch, 1962; Johnson &
Johnson, 1989), Nevertheless, each individual's goal may be thwarted by the
capabilities of the other. These features of interpersonal competition are apt to
become potential causes of insufficient situational correction.
The thwarted goals of competitors evoke hostility toward their opponent
(Deutsch, 1960,1973), but such hostility can lead perceivers to derogate their
opponents' dispositions (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006; Ross & Ward, 1995).
Klein and Kunda (1992) found that participants who expected competition
rated their opponent's ability more negatively. Similarly, Sabatier, Hunter, and
McLaughlin (1987) found that people impugn the motives and reasonableness
of their opponents. However, these studies also did not directly manipulate
situational constraints. In addition, the competitions in these studies were not
interpersonal. Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable that interpersonal competi-
tors may derogate their opponent to enhance themselves. If so, insufficient
situational correction may be more likely to appear when their opponent's
situationally constrained behavior appears to indicate a negative disposition.
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Vonk's study (1999) provided direct evidence to support this prediction. She
found that people in a PD game took longer to process information about the
other player when the other player's behavior was situationally constrained.
She also jfound that the situational correction was significant when the other
player's situationally constrained behavior was cooperative but that the situ-
ational correction was not significant when the other player's situationally
constrained behavior was competitive. She argued that the reason that dispo-
sitional bias reduction (sufficient situational correction) did not appear when
the behavior was individualistic was probably that the potential costs of an
inaccurate judgment were higher in inferences relevant to socially negative
dispositions (i.e., individualistic, dishonest), which are potentially damaging
(Vonk, 1999).
However, for competitors the potentially damaging dispositions are not only
such socially negative ones, but also any high-level abilities that are relevant to
the competition task. Will people make a situational correction for a behavior
of their opponent that reflects high ability?
COMPETITORS' ESTIMATION OF THEIR OPPONENT'S ABILITIES:
"BETTER SAEE THAN SORRY"?
Findings by Chan and Ybarra (2002) showed that participants who expected
interpersonal competition believed that it was more costly to underestimate
than to overestimate how able one's opponent is and that their chances of
success would be higher if they overestimated their opponents. Bond's study
(1979) implies that this belief may influence people's judgment about their
opponent's ability. He found that a future opponent was judged to possess
higher levels of competition-relevant skills (i.e., quickness, intelligence) than
a non-opponent. Vonk's research (1998) suggests that competition produces
caution, careful processing, and conservative judgment as evidenced by the
observation that participants in a competitive outcome-dependent situation
did not derogate the task-relevant social skills of their opponent. They took
more time to read the relevant information, and their judgments were moder-
ate and relatively unaffected by initial expectancies (Vonk, 1998). The above
findings imply that people who expect interpersonal competition may not
derogate their opponent's task-relevant abilities; rather they may overestimate
these abilities in an illustration of the phrase, "better to be safe than sorry." So
it is possible that sufflcient situational correction may not occur in an inference
about an opponent's situationally constrained behavior which reflects high
ability. Since situational correction will lower the estimation of these abilities
and increase the risk of underestimating one's opponent; inferences like this
are contrary to a competitors' usual caution and conservativeness.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
To summarize, few studies exist about how people who expect interpersonal
competition infer their opponent's dispositions from his/her situationally con-
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Strained behaviors and whether they make a situational correction, although
we can find everyday indications of this in the real world. Even fewer stud-
ies have investigated situational correction from the perspective of perceived
threat. We conducted the following studies to explore these issues.
We reasoned that cautiousness may influence whether a situational correc-
tion will be sufficient. When an opponent's behavior reflects a disposition that
implies a high threat level (i.e., competitiveness or high ability), a sufficient
situational correction will lower the threat level of the disposition and may
increase the risk of underestimating the opponent. The potential cost will be
high if the inference is wrong. However, insufficient situational correction will
maintain a high threat level and may keep competitors alert. In this case the
potential cost will be low if the inference is wrong. However, when an oppo-
nent's behavior reflects a low threat-level disposition (i.e., cooperativeness or
low ability), a sufficient situational correction will increase the threat level and
may lower the risk of underestimating the opponent. Thus the potential cost
will be low if the inference is wrong. Insufficient situational correction, on the
contrary, will keep the threat level low, so the potential cost will be high if the
inference is wrong. Therefore, we predicted that insufficient situational correc-
tion is more likely to occur when an opponent's situationally constrained be-
havior reflects a disposition that implies a high threat level than when the be-
havior reflects a low threat-level disposition. We conducted two experiments
to test this prediction.
In competition, people may be quite concerned about their opponent's co-
operativeness and their task-relevant ability because cooperativeness deter-
mines their choice of strategy and ability determines task performance. In
Experiment 1, we focused on cooperativeness, and predicted that situation-
al correction is more likely to occur when an opponent's situationally con-
strained behavior is cooperative (reflects low threat-level disposition) than
that when the behavior is competitive (reflects high threat-level disposition;
Hypothesis 1). However, this predicted result could be interpreted as an ef-
fect of negativity bias (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991) because
competitive or cooperative behaviors can be considered to be behaviors with
negative or positive valences. Alternatively, this predicted result could be in-
terpreted as an effect of a desire to derogate an opponent (Klein & Kunda,
1992; Sabatier et al., 1987) because a sufficient situational correction about
cooperative behavior will decrease the positive evaluation (i.e., cooperative)
about an opponent and an insufficient situational correction about competi-
tive behavior will maintain the negative evaluation (i.e., competitive) about
an opponent. To rule out these alternative explanations, we focused on ability
in Experiment 2, and predicted that situational correction is more likely to oc-
cur when an opponent's situationally constrained behavior reflects low abil-
ity (low threat-level disposition) than when the behavior reflects high ability
(high threat-level disposition; Hypothesis 2).
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PILOT STUDY
Before performing the main experiments, we investigated whether an oppo-
nent's competitiveness and task-relevant ability are dispositions with which
people are particularly concerned when expecting an interpersonal competi-
tion. We asked 16 students (7 male, 9 female) from four Japanese universities to
answer the following five questions, "To what extent are you concerned about
your opponent's task-relevant ability when you are expecting to compete with
him/her?" and "To what extent are you concerned about whether your oppo-
nent is an intelligent (or a competitive, trustworthy, friendly) person when you
are expecting to compete with him/her?" on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very) scale.
The results showed that participants were concerned with their opponent's
task-relevant ability and competitiveness (M = 6.38, SD = 0.50; M = 6.06, SD
- 0.77) more than with their opponent's intelligence, trustworthiness, and
friendliness (M = 5.63, SD = 0.72; M = 4.13, SD = 1.20; M = 3.69, SD = 1.08,
respectively) when they were expecting an interpersonal competition (all ps <
.05 for pairwise comparisons contrasting ability or competitiveness with the
other three items, except for the intelligence/competitiveness comparison for
which i[15} = 1.96, ns). This focus for their concern on ability and competitive-
ness may occur because understanding an opponent's task-relevant ability and
competitiveness seems to participants to be more helpful for them in control-
ling and predicting their outcomes than the other's dispositions. In addition,
we found that participants' evaluations about ability and intelligence (r = .60,
p < .01), ability and competitiveness (r - .45, p < .08), and trustworthiness and
friendliness (r = .55, p < .03) were positively related; whereas competitiveness
and trustworthiness (r = -.51, p < .04) and competitiveness and friendliness (r =
-.62, p < .01) were negatively related. Other correlations were not significant.
EXPERIMENT 1
OVERVIEW
We conducted Experiments la and lb to test whether situational correction is
more likely to occur when an opponent's situationally constrained behavior is
cooperative than when the behavior is competitive {Hypothesis 1).
In Experiment la, we used a questiormaire to explore the perceived threat
level of an opponent's disposition (cooperative or competitive) when people
are expecting to compete with him/her.
In Experiment lb, participants were led to believe that they would compete
with another participant in a game for a chance to win a prize. First, they prac-
ticed five game trials and then read information about the strategy that their
future opponent or non-opponent had supposedly used in the practice trials.
The strategy was supposedly either competitive or cooperative, and the spe-
cific strategy was either freely chosen by the person himself/herself or advised
(recommended by game researchers). Finally they completed a questionnaire
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that asked them to judge the cooperativeness of their future opponent or non-
opponent.
EXPERIMENT 1A
To investigate how much people feel that their opponent's disposition (coop-
erative or competitive) threatens their desired outcome (win) when they are
expecting to compete with him/her, we conducted the following study:
Participants (13 female and 8 male students from Shoin University) were
informed that the study was a short psychology questionnaire about interper-
sonal perception. They were given a questionnaire containing a competition-
related scenario, which read:
Please imagine that you are going to play a two-person trade-off game'
with five trials. The rules of the game are as follows:
Each player has ten 10-yen coins as a fund for each trial. First, each player
will decide individually how many coins they want to give to the other
player and write the number into a "Trade-off Table." Then, the two play-
ers (you are one of them) will show the number to each other simultane-
ously, write the number of coins that you would get from each other into
the "Income Table," and use the following formula to calculate each per-
son's income.
Your income = (coins kept for yourself + 2 x (coins your opponent gave you)l x 10.
The income for both of you will be the same if you give the same amount
of money to each other; you will have more income if you give less than
what your opponent gave you and vice versa. The winner will be the one
who has more income.
Participants then answered four questions, "Do you feel that the other player
will threaten your desired outcome (win) if he/she is a competitive (or coop-
erative) person?" and "What do you think is the probability that you can win
the game if the other player is a competitive (or cooperative) person?" on a
1 (not at all threatening/very low) to 7 (very threatening/very high) scale.
After they completed the questionnaires, the participants were debriefed and
thanked for their participation.
The results showed that the participants felt their outcome would be threat-
ened more if the other player was a competitive (M = 5.71; SD - 0.90 rather
than a cooperative (M = 2.95; SD = 0.80) person, f(20) = 9.21, p < .001). The par-
ticipants' perceived probability of winning was significantly lower when the
other player was thought to be a competitive (M = 3.95; SD = 1.02) than when
the other player was thought to be a cooperative (M = 5.24; SD = 1.04) person,
t(20) = -4.26, p < .01. More importantly, we found that their perception of the
threat level of an opponent's disposition was significantly correlated with a
1. The game was first used in Murata's (1982) experiment.
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perceived low probability of winning, r̂ „„p,y«,, (21) = -.67, p < .01; r^^ (21) =
-.76, p < .01. Therefore, the higher the threat level of an opponent's disposition
(i,e., competitiveness), the lower the perceived probability of a
EXPERIMENT IB
Participants and Design
The participants were 98 Japanese undergraduates (54 male, 44 female, mean
age = 20.3) from Shoin University, They were distributed across the conditions
of a 2 (opponent: opponent vs. non-opponent) x 2 (advice: advice vs. non-
advice) X 2 (strategy: competitive vs. cooperative) factorial design.
Procedure
On arrival, two apparent participants (one participant, one confederate) were
seated in separate individual cubicles. An experimenter first told them that
another two participants were participating in the experiment at the same
time in the next room and then introduced the concept that the study is about
the effect of competition and information on decisionmaking. In addition the
experimenter told them that each of them will play a two-person competi-
tion game with one of the participants in the next room. Thus one of the sup-
posed players in the other room would become their future opponent and the
other would be called their "non-opponent." She further explained that two
types (with or without advice about game strategy) of pamphlets about the
experimental procedure had been prepared, and showed participants samples
of each type. Participants selected their own pamphlet from 20 copies, which
were described as including 10 copies of each type. In fact, all the participants'
pamphlets were the "without advice" type.
Subsequently, the participants read the "Introduction to the Experiment"
and "Introduction to the Game" sections (briefly as follows) in their pamphlet
while listening to the experimenter's explanation.
Introduction to the Experiment: There are three steps in the experiment.
First step (Practice): Practice five trials of the competition game with the
participant in front of you. Second step (Information exchange): Draw lots
to decide whether you will read your future opponent's or a non-oppo-
nent's information. Then read the information and complete a question-
naire about the information. Last step (Competition): Have ten trials of the
game with your opponent. The winner will be awarded some chocolate as
a prize.
2. Experiments la and 2a were conducted after Experiments lb and 2b.
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Introduction to the Game: (Please see the scenario from Experiment la.
The only differences are that we used a "Practice Trade-off Table" and a
"Practice Income Table" here instead of a "Trade-off Table" and an "In-
come Table.")
Before the practice trials, the experimenter asked participants whether they
found any advice in their experiment paper and asked them to place the an-
swer to the question "Is there any advice in your experiment paper?" by the
question, which was under the "Practice Trade-off Table" in their pamphlet.
If they found advice in their folder, the experimenter asked them to use the
advice by entering the number of coins that the pamphlet recommended. If the
pamphlet did not give them any advice, they should make their own choice
about how much money to put down. Of course no advice appeared in any of
their pamphlets. Then the participants practiced five trials with the confeder-
ate. To avoid influencing the outcome (gain or loss) during this practice, the
number of coins that the confederate wrote down was "5,4,6,4,5"; that is, the
strategy was neither competitive nor cooperative.
The participants then drew lots twice, and the experimenter told them to
write the result of their first draw on the upper right corner of their "Practice
Trade-off Table." They were led to believe the following:
1. The first draw (either "A" or "B") would determine their future op-
ponent—the participant in the next room who drew the same letter as
they.
2. The second draw ("opponent" or "non-opponent") determined whether
the participants would get to read the supposed information for their
future opponent or not. Those whose second draw was the "opponent"
lot would read their future opponent's information, and the rest would
read the non-opponent's information. The non-opponent refers to the
participant in the next room whose first lot was different from theirs. The
information they would receive would be a copy of the "Practice Trade-
off Table" that either their opponent or the non-opponent had fllled out
during their practice session.
3. The participants in the next room would also receive copies of the "Prac-
tice T'rade-off Table" of the participants in this room as their source of
information using the same procedure as above.
To summarize, participants who drew A/"opponent" would expect to play
person A from the supposed game in the next room and would get to see the
results of their practice rounds as indicated in their "Practice Trade-off Table."
The same would be true for people who drew B/"opponent," only with per-
son B. But the students who drew A/"non-opponent" or B/"non-opponent"
would play the first person, but only see the results of the person whom they
would not play. Of course, none of these perceptions were true, as we manipu-
lated the outcomes in the following ways.
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Subsequently, the experimenter gave the participants a copy of the "Rules
of the Final Cames" to read, and left the room after explaining that she was
going to make copies of their pamphlets for the use of their opponents in the
other room. After coming back to the room, she returned the pamphlets, and
gave the participants forged information copies that appeared to be marked
according to their lot-drawing.
Each information copy included a "Practice Trade-off," an answer to the
question whether that person had received any advice, and a handwritten "A"
or "B." Of course we had previously prepared eight types of information cop-
ies to manipulate the three independent variables:
Strategy Variable. The participants who received a copy in which the coin
numbers in the "Practice Trade-off Table" that their opponent had supposedly
prepared were "1, 2, 2, 1, 0" formed the competitive strategy condition. The
participants who received a copy in which the numbers were "7, 6, 8, 9, 7"
formed the cooperative strategy condition.
Opponent Variable. The participants who received a copy with a handwritten
"A" or "B" that was the same as the letter they had received in their first draw,
became the opponent condition. The participants who received a copy with a
letter different from their own became the non-opponent condition.
Advice Variable. The participants who received a copy in which the answer
to the question "Have you received any advice about the game strategy?" was
"Yes," indicating that their presumed target (either opponent or non-oppo-
nent, depending on the results of the second drawing) had received advice,
formed the advice condition. The participants who received a copy in which
the answer was "No," formed the non-advice condition. This variable consti-
tuted situational constraint in the perception of the participants.
Participants then read the information and completed the "Information
Questionnaire," which included a manipulation check, dependent measures,
and some other questions. As a manipulation check, we asked "Whose in-
formation did you read? Your opponent's or a non-opponent's?" and "Did
that person received any advice?" We also asked participants to evaluate "the
probability that you can win if you are competing with that person" on an
11-point scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 11 (very high) to check whether
dispositional inference could be used to predict a person's outcome. As an
easily answered dependent measure, the cooperative condition participants
were asked "To what extent do you think that the other person is a coopera-
tive person?," and the competitive condition participants were asked "To
what extent do you think that the other person is a competitive person?" on an
11-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely is not) to 11 (definitely is).̂  After the
participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter announced that
the experiment was finished, and gave the participants a detailed debriefing.
3. To test the similarity of these two scales, we asked 18 students of Shoin University to rate "When
a very cooperative person and a very uncompetitive person face a choice about whether they will
cooperate or compete, how similar will they be in their choices?" on an 11-point scale ranging from
1 (completely different) to 11 (completely the same). The result showed that they believed a very
uncompetitive person was very similar to a very cooperative person while facing a choice between
cooperation and competition (M = 8.89, SD = 1.78).
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Note. Cell means within one row with different subscripts differ at the .05 level.
Participants were thanked by being given the chocolate that had been prom-
ised as a prize for the winner.
We predicted that when the strategy was cooperative, participants of the
opponent-advice condition would be more likely to rate the cooperativeness
of the person in the information lower than participants in the opponent-non-
advice condition, than participants in the non-opponent-advice condition or
than participants in the non-opponent-non-advice condition {Hypothesis la).
We also predicted that the above differences would be difficult to observe
when the strategy was competitive {Hypothesis lb).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Three participants in the non-opponent condition misunderstood and thought
that their information was about their future opponent. An additional three
participants in the advice condition thought that their perceived target had not
received any advice. We excluded their data from our analysis.
Test of Hypothesis
First, the scores of the competitive condition participants were reversed to
yield a cooperativeness indicator based on the finding of the close relation-
ship between cooperation and uncompetitiveness (see footnote 3). Then, the
participants' ratings of the cooperativeness of the perceived target were exam-
ined in a opponent x advice x strategy analysis of variance, which produced a
marginal three-way interaction, f (1, 84) = 3.50, p = .06, r]̂  = .04. Table 1 shows
the cell means and the results of a simple main effect. As predicted, when the
strategy was cooperative, the cooperativeness of an opponent whom the par-
ticipant thought had received advice was rated significantly lower than that of
an opponent who was thought to have not received advice, f(21) = 2.87, p < .01
or of a non-opponent who was presumed to have received advice, t(20) = 2.25,
p < .05, or who did not receive advice, i(20) = 1.99, p < .05. In contrast, when the
strategy was competitive, the cooperativeness of an opponent whom the par-
ticipant thought had received advice was rated not significantly different from
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that of an opponent who did not receive advice or from that of a non-opponent
who was perceived as having received advice or who did not receive advice,
i(21) = 1.02, ns, i(21) < 1, ns, i(19) = 1.17, ns, respectively.
These results indicate that participants whose opponent's cooperative be-
havior was perceived as having been situationally constrained made a suffi-
cient situational correction in their dispositional inference because tbeir rating
of their opponent's cooperativeness was significantly lower than that of the
other three cooperative conditions. These results also indicate that participants
whose opponent's competitive behavior was situationally constrained did not
make a sufficient situational correction because their rating of their opponent's
cooperativeness was not significantly different from the other three competi-
tive conditions. These findings, along with the findings of Experiment la, sup-
port our Hypothesis 1 that situational correction is more likely to occur when
an opponent's situationally constrained behavior is cooperative (reflects low
threat level disposition) than that when the behavior is competitive (reflects
high threat level disposition).
Additionally, the analysis revealed a main effect of strategy. Cooperative con-
dition participants (M = 8.13, SD - 1.78) rated their target as significantly more
cooperative than did the competitive condition participants (M - 4.47, SD -
1.52), F(l, 84) = 116.37, p < .001, if = .58. The analysis also revealed a behavior
X advice interaction, F(l, 84) - 4.07, p < .05, r]̂  = .05. When the strategy was co-
operative, the cooperativeness of a perceived target who received advice was
rated marginally low êr than that of a target ŵ ho did not receive advice, i(43)
= 1.82, p < .08, and M = 7.68, SD = 1.86; M = 8.57, SD = 1.62, respectively. There
was no significant difference when the strategy was competitive, t(45) = 1.03,
ns, and M = 4.70, SD = 1.66; M = 4.25, SD = 1.36, respectively.
Perceived Win Probability
The participants' perceived probability of defeating their perceived target
was examined in an opponent x advice x strategy ANOVA, which produced
a main effect of strategy, F(l, 84) = 29.31, p < .001, rf = .26. Participants whose
perceived target's (either their expected opponent's or the non-opponent's)
behavior reflected a cooperative strategy rated their probability of winning
as higher than participants whose target's behavior reflected a competitive
strategy (M = 7.31, SD = 2.11; M = 5.15, SD = 1.76, respectively). The analysis
also produced a main effect of opponent, F(l, 84) = 4.51, p < .04, Tî  - .05. Par-
ticipants who were assigned to read information about non-opponents rated
their probability of winning as higher than participants who read about their
opponent (M = 6.59, SD = 2.04; M = 5.83, SD = 2.33, respectively).
These results indicated that competitiveness was perceived to be quite
threatening to tbe desired outcome (win) because, compared with participants
whose perceived target behaved cooperatively, participants whose target be-
haved competitively rated their probability of winning as much lower. The
results of the probability of a winning analysis also indicated that people may
make cautious and conservative judgments regarding their future opponent.
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as Vonk (1998) suggested, because participants thought they had less chance
to win against a competitor that they thought would be their opponent than
against one that they knew would not be their opponent, that is, a non-oppo-
nent.
However, as we mentioned in the introduction, the results of Experiment
lb could be interpreted as an effect of negativity bias because competitive or
cooperative behaviors can be considered as behaviors with negative or posi-
tive valences. These results could also be interpreted as an effect of a desire to
derogate an opponent because a sufficient situational correction about coop-
erative behavior will decrease a positive evaluation (cooperative) of an oppo-
nent, and an insufficient situational correction about competitive behavior will
maintain a negative evaluation (competitive) about an opponent. To rule out
these alternative explanations, we manipulated ability in Experiment 2. Low
or high ability behavior can also be interpreted as behaviors with negative or
positive valences. Because our prediction is that situational correction is more
likely to occur when an opponent's situationally constrained behavior reflects
low ability (low threat-level disposition) than when the behavior reflects high
ability (high threat-level disposition), this tendency could not be interpreted
as effects of negativity bias or the desire to derogate an opponent. Specifically,
either a sufficient situational correction about low-ability behavior—a nega-
tive behavior—or an insufficient situational correction about high-ability be-
havior—a positive behavior—will increase or maintain the positive evaluation
of an opponent.
In Experiment lb, we took into consideration the participants' convenience
in answering the questions so we used separate scales for the cooperative and
competitive conditions. We found that people thought a definitely not compet-
itive person was very similar to a definitely cooperative person when facing a
choice between cooperation and competition (see footnote 3). Since in facing
the choice between cooperation and competition a definitely not competitive
person surely will not choose competition, his or her likelihood of coopera-
tion is as high as a definitely cooperative person. Nevertheless, a low score on
competitiveness does not necessarily mean a high score on cooperativeness. To
remedy this limitation, in Experiment 2b, we used a single scale (math ability)
to measure all the participants' dispositional inferences.
EXPERIMENT 2
OVERVIEW
We conducted Experiments 2a and 2b to test whether situational correction is
more likely to occur when an opponent's situationally constrained behavior
reflects low ability than when the behavior reflects high ability {Hypothesis 2).
In Experiment 2a, we used a questionnaire to explore the perceived threat
level of an opponent's disposition (high ability or low ability) when people are
expecting to compete with him/her.
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In Experiment 2b, participants were led to believe that later they would com-
pete against another participant in a math task for a chance to win a prize.
Participants first completed a warm-up math task and then read information
which pretended to reveal their future opponent's or non-opponent's perfor-
mance in the warm-up task. The performance supposedly reflected either high
or low math ability, and the task was supposedly either freely chosen by the
person himself/herself or was assigned by the researcher. Finally participants
completed a questionnaire to judge the math ability of their future opponent
or non-opponent.
EXPERIMENT 2A
We conducted a study to investigate how threatening math ability is when
people expect a competition which is related to math. Participants (15 male
and 8 female, students from Wasada University) were informed that the study
was a short psychology questionnaire about interpersonal perception. They
were given a questionnaire containing a competition-related scenario. The sce-
nario read:
You are going to play a two-person game which is related to math. Two
players separately select a math question for each other from a question
list and answer the question selected by the other player in 1.5 minutes.
After five repeats of this process, your answers will be checked, and the
one who has more correct answers will be awarded a prize.
Participants then answered four questions, "Do you feel the other player
would threaten your desired outcome (win) if he/she is a person who is (or is
not) good at math?" and "What do you think is the probability that you can
win the game if the other player is (or is not) good at math?" on a 1 (not at
all threatening/very low) to 7 (very threatening/very high) scale. After they
completed the questionnaires, the participants were debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
The results showed that the participants felt that their outcome would be
threatened more if the other player was good at math (M = 5.88; SD = 1.15)
than if he/she was not good at math (M = 3.17; SD = 1.09, i(23) = 7.25, p < .001.
The participants' perceived probability of winning was significantly lower
when the other player was good at math (M = 3.75; SD = 1.11) than when the
other player was not good at math (M = 5.21; SD = 1.18, i(23) = -3.93, p < .001.
More importantly, we found that a threat level based on an opponent's math
ability was significantly correlated with a perceived probability of a win, r^^. ^
™athabiHty(24 = -.74, p < .001; r,„_^,,^,,,^(24) = -.71, p < .001. Therefore, the higher
the threat level of an opponent's math ability, the lower the perceived prob-
ability of a win.
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EXPERIMENT 2B
Participants and Design
The participants were 95 Japanese undergraduates (63 male, 32 female) from
Waseda University. They were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a
2 (opponent: opponent vs. non-opponent) x 2 (choice: choice vs. assigned) x 2
(performance: good vs. poor) factorial design.
Experimental Materials
We asked five students at Waseda University to evaluate the difficulty of 16
math questions (12 of these had been used in Li's, study, and 4 easy questions
were added). According to their judgment, there were eight easy ones in the
16 questions, but that long descriptions made three of the easy questions look
difficult.
Procedure
Four or six participants participated in the experiment together. On arrival,
they were randomly seated in individual cubicles. A white card printed with
an "A" or "B" was laid on the table of each cubicle.
After introducing herself and her assistant, the experimenter explained that
psychology research had recently found that math tasks facilitate concen-
tration and analytical thinking. The purpose of the study was to investigate
whether this finding could be used in competition. Then the participants read
the "Introduction to the Experiment" (briefly as follows) while listening to the
experimenter's explanation.
"The experiment has three steps. In the first step (warm-up), you will an-
swer seven math questions in 10 minutes. The answers will be checked
and graded anonymously by the assistant. In the second step (informa-
tion-exchange), lots will be drawn to decide if you will read your future
opponent's or a non-opponent's information. Then you will read the in-
formation and complete a questionnaire about the information. In the last
step (competition), you will compete with one of the other participants in a
new math task. In each trial (Please see the scenario in Experiment 2a).
Who will become your opponent will depend on the card on your table.
Participants whose cards happen to have the same letter (seat number)
will compete with each other."
The experimenter then explained that in the warm-up step there were two
types of tasks—questions chosen by self (free-choice tasks) or assigned by the
researcher (assigned tasks) from the same 16 questions—and there were sev-
eral sets of assigned tasks of which some were very easy, even easier than the
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free-choice tasks, as well as some that were very difficult. She showed one
sample of a free-choice task, as well as very quickly showing three samples of
assigned tasks, so that participants had no time to evaluate the easiness of any
question. Participants then chose their task paper from 20 copies, which were
described as being subdivided into ten copies of free-choice tasks and ten cop-
ies of assigned tasks. In fact all papers were free-choice tasks. Participants then
answered the questions. Ten minutes later they were asked to stop and open
the evaluation page of their task paper which included four items, briefly as
follows.
1. Please fill in your participant number (flie number on the cover of your
paper)
2. Please circle your seat number: ABC
3. Please circle the type of your task: (a) Assigned (b) Free-choice
4. Your task performance in the warm-up: on a 9-point scale (from A+, A,
A-, B, B- . . . to E)
The participants finished the first three items themselves. For the performance
evaluation, the experimenter explained: "'A+' means that a person correctly
answered more than seven questions; 'E' means that a person's answers were
all wrong. The assistant will check your answers, place the correct task perfor-
mance for item 4 on your evaluation page, and copy your pages. The copies
will be used as information either for your future opponent or non-opponent."
The assistant collected the participants' papers and left the room.
Then participants were led to believe that some people had actually received
an "assigned easy task" in the warm-up step in the following two ways.
1. They were told to read the "Pilot investigation of warm-up math tasks"
(briefly as follows)
"Although the average scores of free-choice and assigned tasks were both
"B," the average scores of assigned easy and difficult tasks were "A-" and
"C," respectively. The better score on the assigned easy tasks was due to
the fact that participants who were given the free-choice option did not
have enough time to read the 16 questions thoroughly so that they could
choose the really easy ones."
2. The experimenter showed the participants samples of the assigned easy
and difficult tasks.
After drawing lots to decide whether they could read their future opponent's
information, the participants read the "Competitive task introduction," which
was used to lead participants to believe that they were going to compete
against another participant in a new math task.
The assistant came back with forged information copies. Eight kinds of cop-
ies were prepared to manipulate three independent variables.
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Opponent Variable. If the participants received a copy in which the circled seat
number was same as their own, they formed the opponent condition. The par-
ticipants who received a copy in which the circled seat number was different
from their own formed the non-opponent condition.
Choice Variable. If the participants received a copy in which "free-choice"
was circled, they formed the choice condition. The participants who received a
copy, in which "assigned" was circled became the assigned condition.
Performance Variable. If the participants received a copy in which their op-
ponent or non-opponent's rating of "Task performance in warm-up" was "A,"
they formed the good performance condition. The participants who received a
copy in which the rating was "C-" formed the poor performance condition.
After reading the information, the participants completed an "Information
Questionnaire." In the questionnaire, as a dependent measure, we asked them
to evaluate the "level of your target's math ability" on an 11-point scale rang-
ing from 1 (very low) to 11 (very high). As a manipulation check, we asked
"Whose information did you read? Your opponent's or non-opponent's?"
"What was the type of that person's task? Assigned or free-choice?" and "If
that person's task was assigned, please answer whether you think the task
was difficult." We also asked participants to evaluate "the probability that you
can win a math competition with this person" on an 11-point scale ranging
from 1 (very low) to 11 (very high) to check whether dispositional inference
can be used to predict an opponent's future behavior and a person's outcome
in competition.
After the participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter an-
nounced that the experiment was finished, and gave them a detailed debrief-
ing. Participants were thanked by sharing the chocolate that they had previ-
ously been told would be a prize for the winner.
Here we expected that if the performance that the participants read for their
opponent was poor, participants of the opponent-assigned condition would
be more likely to rate the ability of the person in the information higher than
participants in the opponent-free-choice condition, than participants in the
non-opponent-assigned condition, or than participants in the non-opponent-
free-choice condition (Hypothesis 2a). We also expected that the above differ-
ences would be difficult to observe when the performance was good {Hypo-
thesis 2b).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As expected, participants in the poor-performance-assigned condition thought
the assigned task of their perceived target had been difficult, and most par-
ticipants in the good-performance-assigned condition thought their target's
assigned task had been easy. Three participants in the good-performance-as-
signed condition thought their target's assigned task had been difficult, and
one additional participant correctly guessed that the last (competition) step
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Note. Cell means within one row with different subscripts differ at the .05 level.
did not actually exist in our experiment. We excluded these four participants'
data from our analysis.
Test of Hypothesis
The participants' ratings of the math ability of their perceived targets were ex-
amined in a opponent x choice x performance analysis of variance, which pro-
duced a three-way interaction, f (1, 83) = 4.25, p < .05, rî  = .05. Table 2 shows
cell means and the results of the simple main effect. As expected, when the
performance was poor, the ability of an opponent whose task was assigned
was rated significantly higher than that of an opponent whose task was freely
chosen, t(23) = 2.82, p < .01, and of that of a non-opponent whose task was
assigned, i(21) = 2.12, p < .05, or freely chosen, f(21) = 2.82, p < .01. In con-
trast, when the performance was good, the ability of an opponent whose task
was assigned was not rated as significantly different from that of an opponent
whose task was freely chosen and a non-opponent whose task was assigned or
freely chosen, t(18) = 1.29, ns, t(19) < 1, ns, and f(22) < 1, ns, respectively
These results indicated that participants whose opponent's poor performance
was situationally constrained made a sufficient situational correction for their
dispositional inference because their rating of their opponent's ability was sig-
nificantly higher than for the other three poor-performance conditions. These
results also indicated that participants whose opponent's good-performance
was situationally constrained did not make a sufficient situational correction
because their rating of the opponent's ability was not significantly different
from the other three good performance conditions. Along with the findings of
Experiment 2a, these findings are consistent with our Hypothesis 2 that situa-
tional correction is more likely to occur when an opponent's situationally con-
strained behavior reflects low ability (low threat-level disposition) than that
when the performance reflects high ability (high threat-level disposition).
Additionally, the analysis revealed a main effect of performance. Good-per-
formance condition participants rated the math ability of the supposed target
significantly higher than did poor performance condition participants, F(l,
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83) = 139.16, p < .001, T|2 = .63, and M = 8.79, SD = 1.46; M = 5.04, SD = 1.70,
respectively. The analysis also revealed a marginal interaction of behavior x
choice, F(l, 83) = 3.92, p = .05, r\^ = .05. When performance was perceived to
be poor, the math ability of a perceived target whose task was assigned was
rated significantly higher than that of a target whose task was freely chosen,
t(46) = 2.41, p < .02, and M = 5.61, SD = 1.52; M = 4.52, SD = 1.45, respectively.
There was no significant difference when the opponent's or non-opponent's
performance was good, f(41) < 1, ns, and M = 8.71, SD = 1.52; M = 8.82, SD =
1.44, respectively.
Perceived Win Probability
The participants' perceived probability of winning against the perceived tar-
get was examined in a opponent x choice x performance analysis of variance,
which produced a main effect of performance, F(l, 83) = 11.94, p < .001, r\^ = .13.
Participants whose target's performance was poor rated their probability of
winning as being higher than that of participants whose target's performance
was good, M = 6.67; 5.21, respectively.
These results indicated that high ability was perceived as more threaten-
ing to the desired outcome (win) than low ability, because participants, whose
target's performance seemed to reflect high ability, rated their probability of
winning as much lower than participants whose target's performance seemed
to reflect low ability.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results about dispositional inferences from both experiments suggest that
insufficient situational correction is more likely to occur when an opponent's
situationally constrained behavior reflects a disposition that is perceived as be-
ing of a high threat level (i.e., competitiveness or high ability), than when the
behavior reflects a disposition that has a low threat level (i.e., cooperativeness
or low ability). This tendency is consistent with our basic prediction and may
be due to the effect of the cautiousness and conservativeness of competitors.
Since an insufficient situational correction maintains the perception of an op-
ponent's threat when his or her behavior reflects a high threat-level disposi-
tion and since a sufficient correction increases the perception of an opponent's
threat when the behavior indicates a low threat-level disposition, either alter-
native could serve to make a competitor niore fully aware of an opponent's
threat and thus help the competitor to stay alert. Moreover, the potential cost
will be low even if the inferences are wrong. That is, it is "better to be safe than
sorry."
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MOTIVATION AND COMPETITORS' SITUATIONAL CORRECTION
The participants' cautiousness and conservativeness that was reflected in their
judgments about their competitors in Vonk's study (1998) and in our study
may possibly be due to a motivation to avoid risk. Expecting competition may
make people more sensitive to risk. Many findings show that people are risk
averse (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). People who expect competition may
want to reduce or avoid risk. Additionally, people may feel uncertain about
their judgments when inferring their opponent's disposition from a situation-
ally constrained behavior. Since situational constraints, such as situational
inducements, may make a particular behavior seem probable, regardless of
whether the target possesses that particular disposition, such constraints will
reduce the diagnostic value of the behavior that reflects the corresponding dis-
position, resulting in uncertain dispositional inferences (Trope, 1998). There-
fore, people probably are not certain whether their dispositional inferences
about situationally constrained behaviors of their opponent are accurate.
Competition is also known to enhance the desire to be accurate (Ruscher &
Fiske, 1990) as well as the desire to derogate one's opponent (Klein & Kunda,
1992). However, it is difficult to know whether one's judgments are accurate,
and a derogatory judgment may result in underestimating one's opponent. So
judgments which can reduce or avoid risk may suit interpersonal competitors
better.
Alternatively, the results of the present research seem to indicate that a com-
petitor's inferential tendency is probably caused by interactions between the
desire to avoid risk and the desire to be accurate. Feople possess many possi-
ble goals when processing information (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Ruscher,
Fiske, and Schnake (2000) found that incompatible goals produced more com-
plicated in\pression formation strategies and resulted in more con\plex im-
pressions. Although the present research showed that the inferential pattern
about an opponent's situationally constrained behavior is complex, direct in-
vestigation is needed to discover the mechanism for the motivation underly-
ing this process.
As for the desire to derogate one's opponent, it is probably more likely to
appear and to bias dispositional inferences when the power of the interper-
sonal competitors is asymmetrical. Studies have found the powerful are more
vulnerable to stereotyping others (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske,
& Yzerbyt, 2000), pay more attention to positive and rewarding information
(e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Smith & Bargh, 2008), and prefer to identify
others' actions at a more abstract level (Smith & Trope, 2006, Study 2). Fower
is also found to increase optiniism in perceiving risks and to lead to more risky
behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). It is probable that high power com-
petitors may derogate their opponents and that their dispositional inferences
may not be as cautious and conservative as those of low power competitors.
Therefore, future research which investigates whether high power competi-
tors derogate their opponents, pay attention to situational constraints of their
opponent's behavior, and make situational corrections about their opponents'
behaviors which reflect threatening dispositions may yield interesting results.
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SELF-ASSESSMENTS AND COMPETITORS' SITUATIONAL CORRECTION
Other factors, such as assessments of or confidence in one's own ability and
tactics may also affect the cautiousness and the dispositional inferences of
competitors. People in competition are interdependent, and winning a com-
petition depends not only on the opponent's ability and tactics, but also on
one's own. The findings of Windschitl, Kruger, and Simms (2003) suggest that
competitors' assessments of their own strengths and weaknesses have great
impact when they judge their likelihood of winning. Insufficient situational
correction due to cautiousness and conservativeness is probably more likely to
occur when competitors are not confident in their ability and tactics or when
competitors believe that their ability is about the same level as their oppo-
nent's. In addition, the importance of the outcome of a competition may affect
competitors' cautiousness.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND SITUATIONAL
CORRECTION IN COMPETITION
The participants in this research were Japanese. Although previous cross-
cultural studies have demonstrated that Asians (e.g., Chinese, Koreans) are
less apt to attribute behavior to an actor's personal disposition and more apt
to attribute behavior to the situational context than are Westerners (Choi, Nis-
bett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994), many findings suggest that
both Asians (e.g., Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans) and Westerners (e.g., Amer-
icans) show an equally strong dispositional bias, that is, they do not make a
sufficient situational correction when another's behavior is situationally con-
strained (Choi & Nisbett, 1998, Study 1; Krull, Loy, Lin, Wang, Chen, & Zhao,
1999; Toyama, 1990, 1998, 1999) except in the following situations: When the
situational constraint of a behavior is sufficiently salient (Choi & Nisbett, 1998,
Study 2) and when the situationally constrained behavior is minimally diag-
nostic (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002). Dispositional bias may thus be relatively
universal. Nevertheless, whether Western participants expecting interperson-
al competition will follow the same inferential tendency as was found in the
present research needs further investigation.
INTERGROUP COMPETITION AND SITUATIONAL CORRECTION
Group bias (Tajfel, 1982) has been found to influence dispositional inferences
about out-group members, and situational correction is more likely to occur
when people make inferences from out-group members' situationally con-
strained positive behaviors (Vonk & Konst, 1998). Ruscher, Fiske, Miki, and
Van Manen (1991) also found that people who expect intergroup competition
are more likely to make stereotypical judgments about members of the com-
petitive group. Studies by Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Buidin (2001) found
that participants inferred relatively more extreme and more homogeneous
attitudes about the members of a threatening group even when information
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existed which could have been used to discount the extremity and homogene-
ity of the attitude inference. These studies suggest that insufficient situational
correction and dispositional bias are more likely to occur when the behavior
of a competitive group reflects a threatening disposition. That is, when fac-
ing competition with a group, if a situational correction or a discount could
decrease the threat level of the dispositions and catch people off guard, one
group may not make a sufficient situational correction about the threatening
dispositions of the opponent group, even though they have noticed that the
opponents' behavior was constrained by a situational factor.
SITUATIONAL CORRECTION AND DECISION
MAKING IN COMPETITION
When they expect to interact with others, people predict others' behaviors and
make decisions about their own behaviors on the basis of their dispositional
inferences (Heider, 1944, 1958). However, insufficient situational correction
may cause improper predictions and decisions. For example, in a mixed mo-
tive interaction, such as PD, one important motive for choosing to compete is
fear—fear of being defeated by one's opponent, if one chooses to cooperate
(Yamagishi, 1986,1992). Insufficient situational correction about an opponent's
behavior which reflects a threatening disposition may lead to overestimating
the threat from the opponent, strengthening a person's fear of being defeated,
and as a result stimulating more competition than is necessary. Therefore, an
interesting area to investigate would be whether insufficient situational cor-
rection about an opponent's behavior that reflects a threatening disposition
is related to predictions about an opponent's behavior and people's decisions
about their subsequent behaviors.
The present studies demonstrated when and why insufficient situational cor-
rection and dispositional bias occur in interpersonal competition. The results
of the present studies imply that although an insufficient situational correction
or discount can protect competitors from the risk of underestimating their op-
ponent, it may be an important factor in causing excessive competition. How-
ever, people may not be aware of the fact that what the excessive competition
brings them may be that they will be "sorry" rather than "safe."
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